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Release Date: 01/03/06 00:00:00
For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010
January 3, 2005
Secretary Chertoff: Happy New Year, everybody. Since I took office as Secretary of Homeland Security a little less than a year ago, one thing I have said repeatedly is that we have to be risk-based in our approach to our activities, and that means focusing on consequences, vulnerabilities and threats, and allocating our resources.
The fact of the matter is our security is much too important to be determined with funding decisions that are driven by arbitrary formulas, or political formulas, or a desire to give everybody a little bit of something. What we have to do is drive these decisions by looking at where the major risks are and allocating our priorities accordingly. We have to invest our federal money strategically, protecting those communities where there are national and regional implications, using a disciplined analytical method that properly evaluates the risks.
Today as we are into announcing the 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative grants, I am pleased to say we are taking a giant step forward in implementing this risk-based strategy. It's going to be more robust, it's going to be more precise, it's going to be more analytically sound, and it's going to address a number of the criticisms that have been made about past funding under this program and other programs as well. The fact of the matter is we have learned some lessons, we've listened to some of the critics, and where there is merit to some of those observations, we've incorporated changes to take account of those criticisms.
The 2006 Urban Area Security Initiative will provide $765 million directly to high-threat urban areas. That's what the statute, and that's what Congress has ordered. And this year we've identified 35 areas that are eligible to compete for these funds. Now, I want to use the word "area" very deliberately. We're talking about areas and not cities. The 35 areas we're talking about encompass 95 cities with populations of 100,000 people or more. A single urban area may, in fact, include several cities. For example, what we have identified as the California Bay Area consists of Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose, as well as other smaller communities.
In a sense, this year's formula and approach to this Urban Area Security Initiative grant program focuses upon geographic regions, as opposed to political jurisdictions. Why do we do that? Well, one thing we've done is we've looked at the lesson of the past year: we've looked at what happened in the hurricanes, we've looked at what happened over in London with the terrorist attacks on the rail lines, and that has reinforced the idea that we have to consider consequences, vulnerabilities and threats in the context of a natural region, where the threat is focused and where the impact is going to be felt.
Anybody who looked at what happened, for example, in Katrina and Rita understood that even if the hurricane was directed at a particular jurisdiction, the effects were felt within the entire region. The whole region had to chip in, in terms of assisting. And of course, the region bore the brunt of the evacuations. So we're going to use this regional approach to be more sensible in terms of how we allocate money, focusing on where we think threats naturally occur in terms of geography, as opposed to where political jurisdictional lines happen to be drawn.
A second feature of this 2006 set of UASI grants is that we are, in addition to the 35 cities we've identified, allowing 11 cities that were UASI designees last year to be carried over as eligible into the program for this year. Why are we doing that? Again, this address a criticism we heard last year about the kind of stop-start or start-stop method of funding, where you get a program going in a single year, you couldn't complete it in a year, and then you were left high and dry. To allow some bridging mechanism and allow communities that were identified as UASI communities in 2005 to make the case they need continued funding in 2006 for those programs, we have carried forward 11 cities that were designated last year but not designated this year, we've carried them forward in one bridge year of eligibility. That's designed to smooth out the transition and to give these communities an opportunity to make the case that they should get funding for this year.
Third, how have we determined risk? Well, with every successive year, we've gotten much more specific in terms of the way we measure and weigh the characteristics that go into our risk formula. As I've said, we're talking about consequences, vulnerabilities and threats focused on a region-wide basis. And we've looked at some things that are specific to particular regions. For example, is an urban region particularly close to an international border? Does the pattern of terrorism-related investigations suggest a higher concentration of potential threats in a particular urban region? What is the population? What are the particular vulnerabilities of ports and critical infrastructure -- not only to the city itself, but on a regional basis?
The fact of the matter is, our ability to analyze risk using these three general criteria has gotten more sophisticated every year. We've got more data to work with, we've got better analytical tools to apply to that data, and that means we've got much more specificity in terms of the kinds of characteristics we take into account.
Let me give you an example. In terms of some of the -- just the raw numbers, the 2005 data that we considered in making our evaluations about eligibility this year occupied roughly 43,000 Excel spreadsheet cells and included 2 million calculations -- that's 2005. This year, 2006, the data would occupy over 30 million Excel spreadsheet cells and would include 3.2 billion -- with a B -- calculations. So that gives you an idea of the extent to which we are getting ever more particular and granular in doing these analytical processes in setting forth what the risk matrix is.
Now, I've talked about risk, but there's one other very important piece in the grant process. You may be at risk, but we have to ask ourselves, are you going to use the money wisely. We've all read stories going back several years ago, and they're now particularly urban legends, about money being spent on leather jackets or various kinds of training activities that seem very remote from terrorism. The fact of the matter is, the public has a right to expect that even when a city is in a high-risk category, the money it gets under this program has to be spent wisely and effectively. And in order to make that happen, we've built a series of national preparedness standards that essentially lay out kinds of capabilities and tasks which are relevant to dealing with terrorism threats that cities need to have in order to be prepared to deal with the threat of terrorism.
And using this as a guide, we are going to be asking eligible cities not simply to apply for money because they're at risk, but to create an investment justification for what they propose to spend the money on. In other words, the fact that you are eligible as a high-risk city doesn't end the analysis, it begins the analysis. And the analysis then has to consider what are the needs you're going to be addressing with the particular investments you want to make. Only when we get a justified investment is the money going to flow to the cities that are otherwise eligible. That makes sure that not only are we allocating funding based on risk, but that the funding is being used to build the kinds of nationally critical capabilities that we've identified based on experience are very, very important.
If we're not using the money for critical capabilities, then the money is being wasted. Now, we are being, again, common-sensical and taking a reasonably broad view of what these critical capabilities are. For example, one of the things we've learned is that sometimes there are capabilities you need in a natural disaster that can also be relevant in a terrorism-created disaster. That can involve hurricanes, it can involve fires, which may sometimes be caused by a natural event, sometimes by a terrorist.
Therefore, capabilities such as evacuation, capabilities such as the ability to move rescue aid very quickly, which may have some value in a non-terrorism type of crisis, will be funded as long as there can be a demonstrable connection to a terrorism-related crisis as well. That's, I think, going to be good news to a lot of cities, it's going to give them a little bit more flexibility, but it's going to continue to keep us tethered to the requirement that these be security grants that are tied to some kind of terrorism nexus.
And again, we will evaluate these case by case, always looking to see whether the capabilities are tied to the risks that we've identified. I also want to emphasize in connection with this that UASI is not the only federal program that funds terrorism-related or even natural hazard-related grants. We've got -- since September 11th, this administration has provided $8.6 billion to first responders across the country, in a wide variety of different programs, some focused on ports, some state homeland security grants. But this particular program, which is focused on urban areas, is one which is going to be limited and defined in the way that I've spoken about.
Now, let me address what I can easily anticipate is going to be the response to some of this. Whenever an urban area falls off the list, the UASI list, we hear obviously outcries and complaints. And that's probably going to be the case here, notwithstanding the fact that we've agreed to bridge communities that were included last year over for one year. I have to be very clear about this: the purpose of the UASI program -- indeed, the purpose of all homeland security funding -- is not to generate popularity for the Secretary or for the Department of Homeland Security, it is to address the highest priorities driven by an analytic, risk-based process. UASI funds are not entitlements. Once you get a UASI designation, it doesn't mean that a city has it for the rest of the decade, or the next 20 years. Each year we have to look afresh at what the risks are. We have to consider changes in consequence, changes in vulnerability, and changes in threat. We have to consider the fact that we anticipate that as cities get these funds and they build capabilities, they will actually reduce their vulnerabilities. And over time that should actually remove some of those cities from the UASI list, if this is working properly.
So again, not a popularity contest, not party favors to be distributed as widely as possible, but a funding program that is dedicated to a risk-based set of priorities where we're going to focus on your ability to show highest risk, and your ability to show you can put the money to good use.
And I think that notwithstanding the fact that reasonable people can sometimes disagree about an individual decision here or there, if you compare what we're doing with the program this year in the 2006 fiscal year with past years, you're going to see a significant stride forward in what I think is a policy-supported and disciplined process of using public funds in a way that promotes our national security.
The bottom line is this: When terrorists plan an attack, the attack is not carefully delineated within the lines of political jurisdictions. Protecting the country is not about who gets to give the money out, or what particular jurisdiction gets to have control over the funds that are being distributed by the Federal Treasury, it's about how do we protect those areas where -- at least in the UASI, the case of UASI, high population and high risk is located. As we get disciplined, as we focus on the reality of what we're trying to protect -- which are people, critical infrastructure, ports, things of that sort -- we're going to increasingly be looking to regional approaches, cooperative approaches, and approaches that put politics to one side and talk about real tangible things like risk -- including consequence, vulnerability, and threat.
We will continue to champion risk-based funding, not only in UASI but in all other programs. I know this is not a universally popular approach, but I think it's one that, in the end, if we take our responsibility seriously, is the only approach we can faithfully follow in discharging our obligation to protect the American people against acts of terror.
Now I'll throw it open for some questions. Yes.
Question: Mr. Secretary, much of the criticism (inaudible) upon the grants has been not on urban area planks but rather on the state and local planks. Why aren't you talking about those today? And what are your plans in '06 for that, for those --
Secretary Chertoff: Well, of course, we have to work within the terms the Congress sets. When the budget was before Congress and appropriations were being voted upon, I think the administration was clear, and I was certainly very clear, in making the point that state homeland security grants ought to be moving to a more risk-based formula.
Congress took some steps in that direction. To the extent we have the ability, within the terms of what Congress has passed, to be risk-based, we will be risk-based. To the extent Congress has chosen to allocate money on a different formula, obviously we're going to follow the law. We're going to continue to advocate for a risk-based approach, and we're always going to remind people that while funding may be denied under one program, there are a series of different programs that address somewhat different sets of concerns and capabilities, so all is not lost; if you fall out of one program, there may be another one which is applicable on the merits.
But I want to emphasize, where we can, it's always going to be on the merits; it's not going to be based on spreading the wealth around as widely as possible.
Yes.
Question: Do you think if Congress had acted more (inaudible) you would be doing this today?
Secretary Chertoff: I think that the more money Congress allows us to distribute on a risk-based formula, the more money we will distribute on a risk-based formula. This is not compensation for what's going on in another program. This is simply an application of our general approach here, which is, funding out to be risk-based. It means not everybody gets a little bit of something; we focus, based on the terms of the program, we focus the money as much as humanly possible on where the risk is, and that's how we prioritize.
Yes.
Question: Can you talk a little bit about how much the risk of natural disasters plays into your eligibility along those lines? Say there's marginal terrorism risk in certain areas in northern Florida, but a big hurricane risk. How does that --
Secretary Chertoff: Well, this program is tied to risk of terror, so we're -- within the terms of the program. But the kinds of capabilities that we are considering to be appropriate as needs-based funding are capabilities that would certainly do double duty in the case of catastrophes. So, for example, capabilities to evacuate people would obviously have relevance in a terrorism case with a certain kind of attack, but would also have relevance in a natural disaster of a certain kind.
So we are broadening our sense of what is needed and what is an investment justification to take account of things that may do some double duty.
Question: But eligibility and how they apply, they wouldn't be applying citing their risk for a natural disaster.
Secretary Chertoff: Correct, although common sense is going to tell you that consequence -- there will often be a lot of overlap. For example, where you have critical infrastructure that's a risk to terror, it may also be a risk for natural disasters. And to pick the obvious example, when you have a geographical area that's below sea level, which has a certain consequence and a certain risk that emergences through a natural disaster, that may also apply to a terrorism-driven disaster, and so that would be part of the formula.
Yes.
Question: How will cities already shown to be terrorist targets, like New York --
Secretary Chertoff: Well, I think I'm going to let somebody come up later and maybe talk a little bit about the specific cities. As I say, I mean, we always begin with a clean slate and we evaluate from scratch. On the other hand, we obviously consider the history of what threats have been; that's part of the mix. We consider what the consequences are, and those are likely to be pretty similar from one year to the next. Vulnerability sometimes actually changes in the sense that we lower vulnerability and that's a factor as well. And then we have built this transition year which allows for a little bit of a smoothing out for those cities that are going to lose grant money based on changes in circumstances.
Question: Mr. Secretary, can you talk a little bit more how you expect to further modify your approach? You talked a little bit about doing more of a regional type of thing. Could you explain that?
Secretary Chertoff: Yes, I mean, take something like the port of Los Angeles and the port of Long Beach, which is one regional area. We put those and some other communities in one area for purposes of evaluating eligibility under the program. Now, why does that make sense? Because if you look at the ports, the difference between the two is a political jurisdictional line, it's not a geographic difference, it's not a difference in the way trade operates or where the population is really distributed. So rather than making an arbitrary decision and saying all this goes to one city or another, we say, let's look at the area that's under -- at risk, and let's make sure that area is covered.
Now, that is going to raise a question. People are going to say, well, who gets to actually distribute the money, who gets to decide what the particular grant application is. And our answer is, regions are going to have to get together and they're going to have to come up with a system that allows them to determine what their priorities are going to be and what their investment justifications are going to be.
Hopefully they will figure out a way to allocate votes among themselves or a decision-making process on their own; if they don't, we will. And my recommendation to jurisdictions is, take the opportunity to sit with your -- the mayors ought to sit down, or the county managers ought to sit down with each other, figure out what's a sensible way to pool their needs and come up with a mix of justifications, and we'll honor that. But if they can't do it, if there's going to be a lot of squabbling, then we're going to have to make our own decision about who gets to speak or how we weigh the voting among the various affected communities.
Yes.
Question: Just because these areas have been identified, does it mean that they will each get some money, or is that still an open question?
Secretary Chertoff: It's open, I mean, if an area is not capable of coming up with an investment justification that makes sense, they're not going to get money. Now, it's hard to believe that that's the case. But the fact of the matter is, only half the equation is eligibility under risk. The other part of the equation is, you got to show you're going to put the money to good use. That's going to eliminate the proverbial leather jackets or other kinds of apocryphal stories or non-apocryphal stories you read about in years past.
Question: Mr. Secretary, if I may real quickly just change subjects briefly, is DHS or FEMA, are you sending any support down to the fires in Oklahoma or Texas?
Secretary Chertoff: We have approved approximately a dozen Fire Management Assistance Grants, which pay for firefighting equipment, some pre-positioning, and other costs associated there with. There are some federal assets already deployed in the areas; in particular there are some aircraft which are capable of being used to drop fire retardant. There are some personnel in the areas. We have been in close contact with the emergency management folks in both Oklahoma and in Texas, talking about potential contingency plans for evacuation if the need to evacuate should exceed what is the capability of the various localities that are affected.
I was in over the weekend working on this with our folks, so we're mindful that this is obviously a great challenge to the communities involved. Hundreds of homes have been affected. We will be prepared to, again, work with states and non-profits to make sure people get some housing or some shelter while they're recovering from this firefighting situation. And, again, I say we're constantly reviewing and monitoring the need for firefighting equipment or assistance. Most of that is actually run out of something called the National Interagency Fire Center, which is up in Idaho, and I think it's principally lodged within the U.S. Forest Service, which has a lot of its own assets. But we bring assets from the entire federal government, including DOD, to the table when it comes to assisting on these kinds of crises.
Thanks a lot. Have a happy new year.
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This page was last reviewed/modified on 01/03/06 00:00:00.